Highlights
News: At
a policy conference held at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace last week, six national security experts presented practical
options for reshaping America’s military to make it more relevant,
effective, and affordable in coming years.
News: The
White House will request $526.6 billion for the Pentagon’s base budget
when it issues its budget request on April 10, 2013.
Reports: The
Congressional Budget Office recently examined the Ground Combat Vehicle
(GCV) program as well as three alternatives and determined that the GCV
is the least capable and most expensive option.
Project on Defense Alternatives Perspective: Personnel
interests need not be pitted against procurement interests in a
declining DoD budget era. Reducing end strength is the most straight
forward, balanced and effective way forward.
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State of Play
During his first major policy address,
held at the National Defense University yesterday, Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel provided a somber and humble view of the Pentagon’s future
which recognized that fiscal restraints will constrain the department’s
procurement, modernization, and personnel ambitions for the foreseeable
future. “The Department must understand the challenges and
uncertainties, plan for the risks, and, yes, recognize the opportunities
inherent in budget constraints and more efficient and effective
restructuring,” Hagel intoned. The secretary identified three primary
drivers of growth in the military budget, acquisitions, personnel, and
overhead, and pledged to address all three. American University
professor Gordon Adams was impressed
by Hagel’s recognition of current resource constraints, noting that
“the approach to target is correct — resources constrain strategic
choices — and the target selection hits a bulls eye – excessive
acquisition costs, size and cost of personnel, and, above all, the big
back office… But like most puddings, the proof will be in the eating:
will he discipline the appetites of the [four-star military service]
chiefs?”
Hagel’s speech came exactly one week before the White House’s Fiscal Year 2014 budget request is expected. Reportedly,
the administration will request $526.6 billion for the Pentagon’s base
budget (excluding war costs and mandatory spending) in FY14, and in
doing so, ignore the onset of sequestration. Commenting on the
forthcoming budget request, Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments observes,
“The Pentagon, White House, and Congress are all planning as if the
defense budget will jump back next year like sequestration never
happened…The reality is that the budget caps remain in effect, and the
mechanism of sequestration applies to fiscal year 2014 and beyond if the
budget caps are exceeded… Congress and the White House are no closer to
reaching a compromise to alter or eliminate the budget caps now than
they were in August of 2011 when the Budget Control Act was passed. They
thought it would never happen for fiscal year 2013, yet it did. Now
they are talking the same way about fiscal year 2014.”
As evidence that it is truly ignoring the
automatic cuts, the Pentagon is expected to request $8.4 billion in
FY14 funding for the troubled Joint Strike Fighter program, most of
which will be used to purchase 29 aircraft – the same amount that had
been planned before sequestration occurred. Meanwhile, the former
service chief of the Navy, retired Admiral Gary Roughead, has suggested that the Air Force drop its plans for the F-35A variant, and instead begin purchasing the Navy’s carrier-based F-35C.
If last year was any indication, the President’s FY14 budget request will likely receive little to no support in Congress. Still, POLITICO’s Tim Mak and Austin Wright wonder
what the forthcoming request portends for the military over the coming
year: Will the budget request break the so-called ‘golden ratio’ in
which all three services generally receive an equal share of the budget
pie because of the administration’s recent ‘pivot to Asia?’ The duo
also wonders if the Pentagon will again attempt to cut Guard and
Reserve, the Global Hawk Block 30 drone, or the M1 Abrams tank after
being rebuffed by Congress for similar attempts last year. Early indicators are that the administration will again propose mothballing the Global Hawk Block 30 UAV as well as its Block 40 cousin.
The White House may also consider
terminating or further delaying one of two ground vehicles being
developed by the services, either the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) or the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), the latter of which only barely survived recent budget battles while the former's development was delayed in the Pentagon’s last budget request.
However, if the Pentagon thought that delaying the GCV would help save
the program, it could be terribly wrong: Just this week, the
Congressional Budget Office examined
the ground vehicle program and found that potential alternatives were
both cheaper and more capable. CBO found that purchasing the
German-manufactured Puma infantry fighting vehicle or recapitalizing the
current Bradley Fighting Vehicle would both be cheaper and more
effective than purchasing the new GCV. “Fielding Pumas or upgraded
Bradleys would cost $14 billion and $9 billion less, respectively, than
the Army’s program for the GCV and would pose less risk of cost overruns
and schedule delays,” CBO found.
All told, the Army plans on purchasing more than 1,700 GCVs at a total
estimated cost of $28.8 billion. Separately, U.S. Special Operations
Command is soon expected
to award a $670 million seven-year contract for the development of the
Ground Mobility Vehicle intended to replace the HUMVEE for special
operator use.
Last month, the Government Accountability Office released its annual selected acquisition report,
which examines cost growth and progress in the Pentagon’s acquisition
portfolio. Unlike recent years, this year’s report found that the
Pentagon has made significant progress in reducing the cost of most
programs in its portfolio. The report found that eight of the
Pentagon’s most costly programs saw a total reduction in estimated costs
of $4.9 billion, with the notable exceptions being the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter and first Ford-class supercarrier, whose
estimated costs rose by $101 million and $533 million respectively.
Surprisingly, the watchdog agency found that none of the reductions in
estimated costs came as a result of decreased procurement buys, but
rather, “in several cases -- notably ship programs -- the cost decreases
were due to changes in program estimating assumptions.”
One last problem area identified by GAO
is the ground-based midcourse (GMD) missile defense system whose
development and testing cost projections have ballooned from $236
million to the current estimate of $1.2 billion. Separately, Inside Defense reports
that the Navy is stepping back from plans to invest more than $15
billion in the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) system. The service
is expected to reduce the total cost estimate for the program by 62
percent, which would amount to $5.7 billion in savings once a contractor
is selected as soon as next month.
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Project on Defense Alternatives Perspective
A POLTICO article
this week by Philip Ewing calls attention to the growing perception of a
zero-sum competition between the budgets for military equipment,
ordnance, and supplies (procurement), and the budgets for salaries and
benefits of soldiers and their families (personnel). Both these accounts
grew rapidly during the last decade, but with easy money getting much
harder to find at the Pentagon, defense industry representatives are
beginning to call for reigning in personnel costs.
Of course, tensions rise in any
institution when money is tight. However, there is no reason to reduce
the options at the Pentagon to a trade-off between buying equipment or
buying health care for soldiers. There are other factors that can be
adjusted and thereby reduce the pressures on personnel and procurement
accounts.
For example, the end strength of the
armed forces should be reduced further than current plans. Lower end
strength means lower personnel costs and will reduce the requirement for
procurement of equipment and supplies. Lowered recruitment targets
will also open some room to cut benefits, if that is considered
necessary and desirable. Overall, end strength reductions are the most
straightforward, balanced, and effective way to reduce defense spending.
A practical way to mitigate any risks
attending to a reduced active component military is to put
proportionally more troops in the reserve. Because most reserve
personnel are part-time, reserve units are much less expensive to
maintain than the active duty units.
The relatively large active component of
the military we have today is an artifact of the military activism of
the last fifteen years and the high rate of routine forward deployment
of soldiers, ships and planes. If we are willing to be more selective
in our military activism, deploy fewer troops forward in peace time, and
commit to superior training of our reserves, we will reap large budget
savings from a military with a smaller active component and a stronger
strategic reserve. One other important benefit: If presidents must
first mobilize significant reserves before entering into medium and
large-scale wars, they will be much more likely to restrain themselves
from sending the military into harm’s way when it is not essential to do
so. That’s good for the military and good for America.
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‘Time to Reset Defense’ Conference
On March 26, the Project on Defense Alternatives sponsored a conference entitled ‘Time to Reset Defense: Guidance for a More Effective and Affordable US Defense Posture,’
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Six expert
panelists presented practical options for reshaping America’s military
to make it more relevant, effective, and affordable in coming years.
The assessments of the panelists
repeatedly hearkened back to a common theme: The Pentagon’s budget is
now on a downward path, and, steepened by sequester, this trajectory
will necessitate changes to defense posture and strategy. Panelists
targeted American security policy for producing a disconnect between
defense reality and budgeting. Causes of this disconnect were variously
attributed to an overall lack of strategy and a general eschewing of
multilateralism by both the civilian and military establishments: Col.
Douglas Macgregor (USA, ret.) noted that, “We haven’t had a national
military strategy since 1989.”
The panelists described other products of
this strategy vacuum in definitive budgetary terms. American University
professor Gordon Adams cited poor hardware choices, high personnel
costs and compensation, and the complex support structures required, as
direct fiduciary consequences of a defense budget not bridled by clear
directives. Benjamin Friedman of the Cato Institute described budget
choices less delicately as the consequences of maintaining a “shape the
world luxury budget” instead of a threat-based national security budget.
PDA director Carl Conetta concluded the
conference by posing a stark choice: “It's the Pentagon budget versus
everything else. And the real challenge before us is not whether the
military budget will decline in coming years, but rather, ‘How deep will
it go and what will go?’”
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News and Commentary
Huffington Post: Pentagon Waste Undermines Readiness, Proves Need for Audit – Pete Hegseth
“A month after those cuts began taking
effect, many Americans might look at the aftermath and think, ‘Well, it
doesn't seem so bad.’ And to judge by the initial headlines, which
suggest the most visible impact thus far is furloughs for a relatively
small number of DoD civilians, I can understand where people might reach
that conclusion. But that's the wrong conclusion. The problem with the
defense sequester cuts isn't something that will be felt immediately.
The real problem arises from what will be a long-term, slow motion
hollowing out of our nation's defense investment over the next decade.”
(4/4/13)
Bloomberg: Audits Preventing Taxpayer Overcharges Impeded by Pentagon Cuts - Nick Taborek, Danielle Ivory
“U.S. budget cuts may delay the Defense
Department’s plan to eliminate a $400 billion backlog of unaudited
contractor bills by next year, a Pentagon official said. The Defense
Contract Audit Agency has frozen hiring and will lose about 5 percent of
its workforce, or 250 employees, this year as the Pentagon absorbs $41
billion in automatic reductions, said Patrick Fitzgerald, the office’s
director… The backlog of unaudited expenses has more than quadrupled
since 2005 as awards surged because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Contractors that have been snared in the audit backlog wouldn’t get
paid until their requests are approved, which might put millions of
dollars on hold for years… Even under ideal circumstances, the goal of
getting through the backlog by Sept. 30, 2014, was going to be
daunting.” (4/3/13)
National Defense: Hagel: Pentagon Prepared to Make ‘Big Choices’ to Reduce Spending – Sandra Erwin
“The Pentagon is not in denial about the
coming austerity, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said. The prospect of
$500 billion in sequester cuts over the next decade, he cautioned, means
sacred cows will no longer be tolerated in the military’s budget… To
soften the impact of the sequester — and of whatever other fiscal blows
might come — the Defense Department must set priorities, he said. That
would prepare the Pentagon to ‘deal with further reductions in the
defense budget that could result from a comprehensive deficit reduction
deal or the persistence of sequester level cuts.’” (4/3/13)
Foreign Policy: The end of fear: Facing reality about defense spending – Gordon Adams
“The federal budget is coming out next
week. The defense part has been declared dead on arrival because it does
not take sequestration into account, just works off of last year's
request and projects about a 3 percent cut in the Pentagon's funding,
year over year. It will go down farther. But what is more interesting is
the extent to which fear about defense is being replaced by realism
about the sequester and declining defense budgets. Both may be more
absorbable than the rhetoric has been suggesting.” (4/2/13)
The Hill: Study puts total price tag for Iraq, Afghanistan wars at more than $4 trillion – Jeremy Herb
“The final cost of the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars will be between $4 and $6 trillion — and most of those
costs have yet to be paid, according to a new study out of Harvard
University. The report from Harvard Kennedy School professor Linda
Bilmes finds the Iraq and Afghanistan wars together will be the most
expensive in U.S. history when long-term medical and disability costs
for service members are factored in.” (3/29/13)
The News Tribune: Outdated Stryker parts piled up in Auburn warehouse – Adam Ashton
“The Army program charged with keeping
thousands of eight-wheeled Strykers running over the past decade had its
eye so much on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that it neglected to keep
its books. It accumulated nearly $900 million worth of Stryker
replacement parts — most of them in an Auburn warehouse — with much of
the gear becoming outdated even as the military continued to order more
equipment, according to a Defense Department Inspector General report
released late last year.” (3/29/13)
Bloomberg: Ships Costing U.S. $37 Billion Lack Firepower, Navy Told – David Lerman
“The U.S. Navy’s troubled Littoral Combat
Ship, a vessel intended to be small and speedy for use in shallow
waters close to shore, lacks the firepower it needs, a top U.S. navy
commander said in a classified memo. Vice Admiral Tom Copeman, the
commander of naval surface forces, called on the Navy to consider a ship
with more offensive capability after the first 24 vessels are built,
according to a Navy official who asked not to be identified discussing
the confidential document.” (3/28/13)
Government Executive: A Growing Consensus for Shrinking the Defense Budget? – Charles Clark
The ‘silver lining’ of sequestration is
that the defense budget is coming down as political parties and the
public focus on the economy and debt, a panel of progressive defense
specialists said on Tuesday. Though Pentagon leaders have warned of
catastrophe if their budget absorbs a 15 percent cut, few in the
department have awoken to the new consensus that a military drawdown is
inevitable, according to speakers at a forum titled ‘Time to Reset
Defense’ sponsored by the left-leaning Center for International Policy.
Their visions for the new era in American defense strategy ranged from
further troop reductions to narrower overseas missions to abolishing the
Marine Corps. (3/26/13)
Foreign Policy: Can the Marines Survive? – Lt. Col. Lloyd Freeman
“The Marines are a door-kicking service,
designed to breach enemy territory and establish an entry point for the
Army's strategic land capability. But the U.S. military's development of
unmanned aircraft, combined with stealth technology and unmatched ISR
capability, makes it almost impossible for an enemy today to
significantly impede the landing of U.S. forces on a beach or at a port.
Forcible entry no longer requires landing forces -- it takes precision
strikes, coordinated by special operations forces as needed. But if the
door is going to be kicked in by a cruise missile, an unmanned aircraft,
or other platform delivering precision munitions, why does the Marine
Corps insist on maintaining such a large amphibious forcible entry
capability based around the same Marine who stormed ashore at Tarawa?
Because to argue that the United States does not need a forcible-entry
force would be to question the very necessity of having a Marine Corps.
Unfortunately, that is the question the Corps must now answer.” (3/26/13)
FCW: Funding the military of the future – Amber Corine
“It is a widely held principle that
strategy should not be driven by budget, but the two have been
intertwined at the Pentagon for some time, experts say. For the military
to be most effective – and to best posture the U.S. for continued
economic recovery – the two need to be looked at separately, and tough
choices must be made.” (3/26/13)
Democracy Arsenal: Nuclear Deterrence, National Security, and Budgetary Savings – Katie McBee
“The argument for reducing excess nuclear
arms often focuses on enhancing the nonproliferation regime. However,
while less discussed, the financial benefit of nuclear reductions is
significant, especially in the wake of sequestration. The exact amount
of savings possible depends upon the specific reductions made, but
easily reaches the billions. But determining safe, smart levels of
reductions first requires thinking about the legitimate national
security role of American nuclear forces. Throughout the nuclear age,
the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear forces has been providing deterrence.
Given the size and expense of U.S. nuclear forces the key question is:
what special advantages in terms of deterrence does such an overwhelming
nuclear arsenal give the U.S.? The answer: not much.” (3/26/13)
Foreign Policy: Error Report: Is there a government conspiracy to save the F-35? – Winslow Wheeler
“DOD appears to have an unseen hand in
influencing the text of GAO reports, and the management guidance as
perceived by the GAO staff is to accept the DOD guidance to reduce as
much as possible any areas of disagreement. The differences may only be
subtle in a final GAO report, or they could appear in the form of
strangely unsubstantiated assertions and conclusions -- the sort of
vapid statements that appear in GAO's new F-35 report. Indeed, the only
other explanation for the data-free assertions might be that the work at
GAO, especially the review process, was sloppy and did not merit what
used to be the highly prized declaration (known as the ‘GAGAS
statement’) that all the work for the report was performed "in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards," which
-- justified or not -- appears on page two of the report.” (3/22/13)
The Hill: Time for a new peace dividend – Rep. Jared Polis
“Although fighting terrorism has been the
rationale for the boost in military spending, a relatively small part
of the Pentagon's budget is devoted specifically to counter-terrorism.
We continue to spend at historically high levels because the military
establishment is fixated on the big wars and the threats of the past.
Even with sequestration, the Pentagon budget still exceeds the average
level of the Cold War era. While those on the left and the right
subscribe to different economic theories, most agree that as long as our
defenses are strong, there are more productive ways to use our
resources than excessive military spending. Conservative economists
might model high-growth scenarios where the peace dividend is reinvested
in tax cuts. Liberal economists might model a scenario that emphasizes
public investment in health, education, and economic infrastructure.
Either way, additional Pentagon budget cuts beyond sequestration levels
would serve the goal of restoring growth while reducing debt.” (3/20/13)
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Reports
Center for a New American Security: Listening to the Generals: How Military Advice Affects Public Support for the Use of Force (4/4/13)
Congressional Budget Office: The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program and Alternatives (4/2/13)
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks (4/2/13)
Government Accountability Office: Defense Health Care: TRICARE Multiyear Surveys Indicate Problems with Access to Care for Nonenrolled Beneficiaries (4/2/13)
Government Accountability Office: DOD Procurement of Mi-17 Helicopters (4/1/13)
Government Accountability Office: Major Automated Information Systems: Selected Defense Programs Need to Implement Key Acquisition Practices (3/31/13)
Congressional Budget Office: Supplemental Appropriations: 2000—Present (3/29/13)
Government Accountability Office: Defense Contracting: Actions Needed to Increase Competition (3/28/13)
Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs (3/28/13)
Congressional Research Service: China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress (3/31/13)
Government Accountability Office: Defense
Technology Development: Technology Transition Programs Support Military
Users, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Measurement of Outcomes (3/7/13)
John F. Kennedy School of Government: The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets (March 2013)
Department of Defense: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (March 2013)
Department of Defense: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (March 2013)
Department of Defense: Multi-Service
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Reconnaissance and Surveillance (March 2013)
Department of Defense: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Treatment of Biological Warfare Casualties (March 2013)
Department of the Army: Legal Support to the Operational Army (March 2013)
Department of the Army: Offense and Defense (March 2013)
Department of the Army: Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks (March 2013)
Department of Defense: Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (February 2013)